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CLEARLY AMORPHOUS: FINDING A PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP FOR CHILDREN RESISTING GANG
RECRUITMENT
Adreanna Orlang+
The applicant, a minor, fears that he will be harmed or killed by
gang members on account of his membership in a particular social
group: young men in Guatemala who resist gang recruitment. When
the applicant was eleven years old, members of gang XXX began
heavily recruiting in the applicant’s town. Gang members told the
applicant and other young boys in the neighborhood that if they
refused to join gang XXX, they and their families would be killed.
The first time he refused to join gang XXX, five gang members beat
the applicant and left him bleeding. Gang members followed the
applicant around his town daily, hitting the applicant with sticks and
knives when he tried to hide from them. Once, gang members sliced
the back of the applicant’s neck with a machete. The applicant
relocated to another town to escape the harm, but when the gang
found out that he had relocated, the gang told the rest of his family
that they would be exterminated if the applicant did not join their
ranks. To demonstrate the seriousness of their threats, gang
members shot the applicant’s grandmother in the head.1

+

J.D./M.A. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A., 2006, High Point University. The author would like to thank, Juan Fogelbach,
Christina Kube, and Charles “Locky” Nimick for their constant guidance and support during the
writing process. The author would also like to express her gratitude to her parents and her
brother, three of the most inspiring individuals she knows. Finally, this Note is dedicated to the
author’s baby sister, Rachel, in anticipation that life will also take her to wonderful places.
1. This narrative, though completely fabricated, resembles a typical asylum claim based on
resisting gang recruitment. See, e.g., Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 2011) (“He
claimed his resistance to gang recruitment would inspire manipulation, extortion, and even death
threats from gang members.”); Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1135 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[G]ang members broke into [the applicant’s] home, pointed guns at [her] family members, and
took [the applicant’s grandson] with them. They told [the grandson] that they would rape his
sister if he did not join.”); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 2009)
(describing how gang members threatened to kill the applicant and the applicant’s family, and
then attacked the applicant’s father after the applicant refused to give the gang money or join the
gang); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the applicant’s testimony,
stating “[t]he gang members wanted [him] to join the gang but he refused [and] [a]s a
result . . . [o]n one occasion, they cut his neck with a switchblade”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579,
580 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[G]ang members warned . . . that the brothers must join the gang or else their
bodies might end up in a dumpster . . . . [T]he respondents . . . learned that the [gang] shot and
killed a young boy in the neighborhood after he refused to join the gang.”).
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Political asylum is protection offered by a sovereign authority to a person
who is no longer safe in his or her home country.2 An alien applying for
asylum in the United States must prove that he or she is a refugee within the
statutory meaning of the term.3 This includes showing that he or she has
suffered persecution or has a “well-founded fear of persecution,” either of
which must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”4 Additionally, the alien must
prove that he or she is unwilling or unable to seek protection from his or her
home country.5 Persecution based on religion, nationality, race, and political
opinion is usually easy to recognize.6 However, those individuals whose
reasons for seeking asylum do not fit neatly into one of these four categories
may attempt to fit their claim into a fifth category—membership in a particular
social group (PSG).7
2. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987);
see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Cardoza-Fonesca,
480 U.S. 421. The act of granting asylum is almost as old as recorded civilization, with the
earliest references to asylum being made more than 3500 years ago in the early empires of the
Middle East. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, PROTECTING REFUGEES &
ROLE
OF
UNHCR
5
(2009),
available
at
THE
http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/4034b6a34.pdf.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
4. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). These categories of persecution are commonly referred to as the
five “protected grounds” of asylum. See, e.g., Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he evidence . . . did not rise to the level needed to show a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of a protected ground.”). The statute places the burden on the applicant to
prove that one of the protected grounds is a central reason for the persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(42)(A). In 2009, the United States granted 22,119 individuals
asylum. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 43 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary
/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Jiang, 474 F.3d at 26 (explaining that the applicant’s asylum claim was based
on his fear of religious persecution after helping a Catholic priest avoid arrest for illegally
practicing his faith); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 545–47 (7th Cir. 2006) (describing the
applicant’s claimed persecution as premised on nationality because the applicant faced
persecution by the Eritrean government on account of her partial Ethiopian ancestry); Sulaman v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 147 F. App’x 872, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining the
applicant’s asylum claim was premised on fear of racial perseuction by black South Africans
because the applicant and his family are of Indian descent and “[s]ince the end of apartheid,
Indians were discriminated against by blacks”); N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 314–15 (B.I.A.
1998) (explaining the applicant’s original asylum claim was based on persecution for political
opinion because the communist-backed Afghan government beat the applicant and detained him
for one month after the applicant distributed anti-communist flyers).
7. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219 n.5, 232 (explaining that the category of
“membership in a particular social group” was added as an afterthought to the U.N. convention
relating to the Statute of Refugees, from which Congress adopted its definition of “refugee”; it
may have been added to capture claims that do not fall squarely into one of the other categories);
see also infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. However, this category is not unlimited and is
not to be mistaken for a safety net. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding
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Since the Central American civil wars of the 1980s, street gangs known as
maras have established a foothold in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.8 Central American countries offer gangs a fertile breeding
ground as many Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran communities, still
reeling from the devastation created by the civil wars,9 suffer from widespread
poverty, flawed social infrastructures, and pervasive violence.10
These gangs, largely composed of young men who have been marginalized
by social and economic problems,11 obtain control of urban territories through

that boundaries on the definition of PSGs are necessary because the term is not meant to be a
“catchall” for claims that do not fit perfectly into the other categories).
8. Connie McGuire, Wash. Office of Latin Am., Why a Resource Manual on Central
American Gangs?, in CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE 1, 1
(2008); Oliver Jütersonke et al., Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central
America, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 373, 378–80 (2009) (explaining the history of maras in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and comparing the transnational maras to the more localized
youth groups known as pandillas); id. at 376 (“Although gangs . . . have long featured in Central
American societies, their growth and influence over the past two decades is unprecedented.”); see
MANZ, WRITENET, CENTRAL AMERICA (GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR,
also BEATRIZ
HONDURAS, NICARAGUA): PATTERNS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 25 (2008) (reporting that
in Honduras, 500 per 100,000 people are members of gangs; in Guatemala, the number is 111 per
100,000; and in El Salvador, the number is 152 per 100,000 (citing Mark A. Cohen & Mauricio
Rubio, Solutions Paper: Violence and Crime in Latin America 9–10 & fig.14 (June 2007) (final
version published in LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES COST AND BENEFITS (Bjorn
Lombard, ed. 2000)))); CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34112, GANGS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 5 (2011) (estimating that approximately 70,000 gang members (not limited
to maras) live in Central America, with the most severe activity occurring in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala).
9. In El Salvador, for example, the left and right wings of the government fought a civil
war beginning in 1980, in which guerilla and national forces clashed. Juan J. Fogelbach,
Comment, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador’s Struggle to Reclaim
Social Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INTL. L. J. 223, 226–27 (2005). Over a period of twelve years,
75,000 people perished and the youth were left troubled with memories of grenade blasts and
massacres. Id. at 227. Many Salvadorians left the country to escape the violence. Id. The death
toll, combined with the relocation movement, decimated Salvadorian family structures. Id.
10. See id. at 252 (describing that years of war have left Central America with “broken
family structures, violent childhoods, abject poverty, and [a] large black market of left over war
caliber weapons that allow [gangs] to flourish”); see also MANZ, supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]he
economic devastation caused by these internal wars . . . and the inability of governments to invest
in infrastructure and human capital have contributed to increased gang membership and crime.”
(footnote omitted)); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidance Note on Refugee
Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, ¶¶ 10–11 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Guidance
Note on Refugee Claims], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bb21fa02.html
(stating that street-gang activity is most prevalent in areas that suffer from poverty and weak rule
of law, among other things). Central America has “the highest male youth homicide rates in the
world.” Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 378 n.8 (citing PAULO SÉRGIO PINHEIRO, UNITED
NATIONS, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 357 (2006)). In 2004, the annual
homicide rate in Central America was over four times the global homicide rate. Id. at 374–75.
11. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
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intimidation and fear.12 Gang activities range from minor crimes such as
vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assault, to serious offenses such as drug
In
trafficking, extortion, murder and other crimes of violence.13
gang-controlled areas,14 local residents live with gang violence on a daily
basis.15
To maintain their numbers and influence over an area, gangs force poor and
socially marginalized young people to join their ranks.16 Gang members view
resisting recruitment as a sign of disrespect; thus, resistance often induces the
gang to retaliate violently against individuals who refuse gang association.17
Gangs do not limit retaliation to the individuals being recruited; to coerce
individuals into joining, gang members will also frequently threaten the
resistor’s family members.18 However, even those youths who have only weak
family ties are still susceptible to recruitment because they lack parental
guidance.19
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—El Salvador, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/SLV/CO/2 (June 27, 2007).
12. Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Note, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central America and Those
Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 409–10 (2006) (explaining that gangs maintain
their power over an area because of widespread membership, government corruption, access to
sophisticated weaponry, and willingness to exercise force). When exerting their control, gangs
often extort neighborhood residents, local businesses, and public transportation. MANZ, supra
note 8, at 4. Gangs demand money from these local entities to secure “protection,” implying that
the gangs will not hurt them if they pay. Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 234; see also SEELKE, supra
note 8, at 6 (explaining that failure to pay extortion demands usually results in violent retaliation).
For example, in Guatemala, gang leaders demand from bus companies as much as $25 per bus
each week, totalling nearly $5000 per week. INT’L CRISIS GRP., GUATEMALA: SQUEEZED
BETWEEN CRIME AND IMPUNITY 13–14 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld
/docid/4c2847a72.html. If the sums are not paid, the bus drivers are killed. Id. at 14.
13. SEELKE, supra note 8, at 4.
14. Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 246 (“Turf is commonly established by graffiti on zones of
influence—areas where crime is primarily committed by members of one gang.”). According to
one commentator, gangs commonly take over “slums and shantytowns,” which are left
unprotected by public security. Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 4.
15. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1, 8.
16. Id. ¶ 7; see also S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008) (stating the immigration
judge believed the applicants’ harm resulted from the gang’s desire to recruit the applicants as
opposed to persecution on account of membership in a PSG or a certain political opinion).
17. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 6.
18. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing how a
gang threatened to kill the applicant or a member of his family if the applicant tried to flee the
country a second time to escape the gang); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579–80 (describing how the
gang threatned to rape a female family member if the two male applicants did not join the gang).
19. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 36. In Guatemala, where 111 of
every 100,000 people are gang members, civil war and its aftereffects have left many children
orphaned. Street Children—Guatemala, TOYBOX, http://www.toybox.org.uk/street-children
/where-we-work/guatemala.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). Those not orphaned may still be
abandoned because their parents are impoverished. Id. Between 2008 and 2009, one child was
abandoned in Guatemala every four days. Id. Additionally, two-thirds of Guatemalan children
live in poverty, making them likely targets for gang recruitment. Id.
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Once a gang targets an individual, the threat of severe harm often remains
constant and unwavering until the youth acquiesces to recruitment.20
Children who oppose gang recruitment find little relief from retaliation.
Relocation within the same country does not guarantee protection because
many gangs have nationwide influence,21 which Central American
governments have been unable to forestall.22 To escape persecution, an
increasing number of children who resist gang recruitment in Central America
seek security elsewhere, commonly applying for asylum in the United States.23
However, in the majority of these cases, gangs do not threaten or harm these
children based on their religion, nationality, race, or political opinion.24
Therefore, to establish refugee status, these youths must attempt to fit within
the definition of an acceptable PSG.25

20. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 6; see also Ramos-Lopez, 563
F.3d at 857 (recounting the applicant’s history of receiving reptetitive threats of violence for his
continued refusal to join the gang); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580 (describing how gang
members harassed and beat the applicants, threatening to kill them if they did not join the gang).
21. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 53–54 (noting how gangs have
national or regional networks making internal relocation unsuccessful because gangs can locate
their targets in both rural and urban settings outside of the neighborhoods they directly control).
22. See NIELAN BARNES, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
TRANSNATIONAL YOUTH GANGS 8–9 (2007), available at http://www.wola.org/publications
/transnational_study_cu_youth_gangs (explaining that weak states, like those in Central America,
lack the capabilities required to contain gang violence in any meaningful way). For example, El
Salvador has been unable to contain gangs because of prison overpopulation, insufficient
resources, and the police’s incapability to respond to the vast amount of criminal activity.
Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 253. Furthermore, the police are often absent, allowing gangs to
effectively maintain control over their respective territories without state interference. See, e.g.,
Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 4.
23. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
24. Cf. id. ¶¶ 12–17 (describing the various categories of gang victims, including individuals
resisting recruitment, former and current members, anti-gang advocates, and family members of
those targeted by gangs). Some applicants have applied for asylum on the theory that their
resistance to gang recruitment equates to a manifestation of political opinion; however, these
claims have not been any more successful than those involving PSGs. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson
v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding that mere political
opposition to gang activity is not enough to qualify for asylum based on persecution for political
opinion); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the principle
that a mere “general aversion” to gang activity does not fit into the category of a political
opinion), abrogated in part by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 (9th Cir.
2008). But see Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 45–51 (describing
circumstances in which gangs may be so intertwined with the state and state politics that
consideration of whether opposition to gang activities is a political opinion may be warranted).
25. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (identifying the five “protected grounds”
warranting asylum, and explaining the significance of the PSG category). One commentator
explained that, “[a] major hurdle to gang-based asylum claims is successfully fitting the claim
into one of the five protected grounds.” SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., CAIR COAL., SEEKING
ASYLUM FROM GANG-BASED VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A RESOURCE MANUAL 8
(2007), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/GangResourceManual.pdf.
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Youths who use their resistance to gang recruitment as the basis for a PSG
have had only minimal success obtaining asylum in the United States.26 The
Board of Immigration Appeals27 (Board) firmly holds that a PSG for children
resisting gang recruitment is too “amorphous”—lacking the sufficient
particularity required for a grant of asylum.28 Unless the applicant identifies a
more particularized social group, the asylum claims of these youths will
continue to be denied.29 Upon denial of their asylum claims, these children are
removed from the United States and sent back to their home countries where
they face harm and possible death at the hands of their persecutors—the gangs
they refuse to join.30
The rapid evolution of PSG analysis has created the potential to change this
unfortunate result.31 In August 2010, an immigration judge granted asylum to
a Mexican woman on remand in the matter of L.R. based on the woman’s fear
of domestic violence.32 The immigration judge made a favorable grant based
26. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing two decisions from the Board of Immigation Appeals
denying PSG status to applicants who cited resistance to gang recruitment as grounds for asylum
and positing that immigration judges and the Board will continue to deny similar applications in
the future). The few decisions that favor PSGs for children resisting gang recruitment come from
immigration judges, but these opinions are often unreported. Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421.
Furthermore, even when these opinions exist, they are often difficult to obtain because they are
not made public. Id. at 421 n.83. Only decisions from the appellate body—the Board—and from
reviewing courts are available on commercial databases. Id.
27. The Asylum Officer Corps of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a
sub-agency of the Department of Homeland Security, adjudicates asylum claims in the first
instance. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2009, at 4 (2010).
Applicants who fail to establish eligibility for asylum to USCIS asylym officers and lack valid
immigration status are subject to removal proceedings, presided over by an immigration judge of
the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Id. During these proceedings, the immigration
judge reviewing the matter “de novo” makes the eligibility determinaton independent of the
officer’s decision. For a detailed overview of this process, see Matter of L.R., U. CAL., HASTINGS
CENTER
FOR
GENDER
&
REFUGEE
STUD.,
http://egrs.uchastings.edu/emphasis
/matter%20of%20LR.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). The judge may grant asylum, or deny the
application and order the alien’s removed from the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., supra, at 4. If asylum is denied, the applicant may appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id.
28. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008).
29. See id.; see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421 (observing that an immigration judge is
more likely to find a legitimate PSG with an increased showing of particularity).
30. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2011).
31. See infra Part II (describing the most recent change in PSG analysis, which occurred in
the matter of L.R.); infra Part III (discussing how the framework offered by the Department of
Homeland Security in L.R. can be applied to children who resist gang recruitment).
32. Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Standard on
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14 (reporting on the decision as announcecd by
the woman’s attorney). The actual decision of the immigration judge, like all immigration judge
decisions, is not public record. See Corsetti, supra note 12, at 421 n.83. Asylum proceedings are
conducted in private to protect the anonymity of the applicant, which is essential when the
persecutor may still be searching for the applicant. Id. However, the attorney of record for the
woman graciously provided redacted copies of the immigration judge’s order granting asylum,
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upon a supplemental briefing submitted by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) at the request of the Board.33 The DHS brief set forth
alternative ways of defining a PSG for victims of domestic violence seeking
asylum.34 The analytical concepts devised by DHS, as applied to situations
involving domestic violence, reveal a promising avenue for formulating a
successful PSG for children resisting gang recruitment.35
This Note examines the recent grant of asylum in the matter of L.R. and
advocates for the application of DHS’s PSG analysis in that matter to children
seeking asylum based on persecution for resisting gang recruitment. First, this
Note discusses an applicant’s burden of establishing their eligibility for asylum
on the grounds of membership in a PSG. This discussion outlines the
Department of Homeland Security’s supplemental brief filed in the matter at the request of the
Board, and the applicant’s response brief. This Note utilizes information gathered from these
sources, which are on file with the author, as well as from media reports. See, e.g., Obtaining
Asylum in the United States, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9b
b95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnextoid=dab9f067e3183210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD
&vgnextchannel=f39de4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 10,
2011).
33. Supplemental Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 3, L.R. [redacted] (B.I.A.
Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Supplemental Brief], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu
/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf. The procedural history of this matter is
important in understanding how the decision was rendered. In October 2007, the immigration
judge denied the application for asylum based on past and future potential domestic violence. Id.
at 2. On appeal, the Board requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the
applicants, L.R. and her two sons as derivative beneficiaries, qualified as members of a PSG with
claims based on domestic violence. Id. at 3. In April 2009, DHS submitted a brief stating its
current postion on whether, in general, domestic-violence victims with similar claims are
members of a PSG, but DHS also went one step further. See id. at 4–5. Because asylum
applicants have the burden of proof, DHS normally limits its briefing to critiques of the PSG
analyses asserted by the applicant. Id. However, DHS—recognizing the unsettled nature of the
law as applied to domestic-violence claims—offered alternative analyses to qualify asylum
applicants as members of a PSG to propogate clarity in this area of law. Id. at 5. In light of these
alternatives, DHS recommended remanding the matter to the immigration judge for further
fact-finding. Id. Shortly preceeding this brief, DHS and the applicants had filed a joint motion
seeking the same. Brief of the Respondent in Support of Applications for Asylum, Withholding
of Removal, and CAT Relief at 2, L.R. [redacted] (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Applicant’s
Brief] (on file with the author); see also Matter of L.R., supra note 27. On remand, the applicants
submitted their supplemental brief, which applied their factual background to the alternatives set
forth by DHS. Applicant’s Brief supra at 3–4. DHS, upon review of the new evidence, agreed
that the applicants were eligible for asylum, which the judge subsequently granted on August 4,
2010 “by stipulation of the parties.” Matter of L.R., supra note 27; see also Order of the
Immigration Judge on Remand at 1, L.R. [redacted] (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Order of the
Immigration Judge] (on file with the author).
34. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 3–5. Because the regulations provide that
only decisions by the Board and Attorney General are binding precedent, the DHS brief and the
immigration judge’s decision are only persuasive authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2011); see
also Matter of L.R., supra note 27.
35. See infra Parts II–III; cf. Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (explaining that the reasoning in
DHS’s brief provides a sound approach to the creation of PSGs related to gender-based claims).
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precedential decisions that helped form the current asylum-eligibility analyses.
Next, this Note considers how the Board and federal circuit courts of appeals
have regulated prior articulations of PSGs for children resisting gang
recruitment. Then, this Note describes the facts underlying the matter of L.R.
and analyzes the frameworks used by DHS to identify viable PSGs in its
supplemental brief. In particular, this Note identifies which elements of these
frameworks should be applied to asylum claims beyond those involving
victims of domestic violence. In conclusion, this Note applies the L.R.
frameworks by analogy and proposes a PSG that establishes asylum eligibility
for children resisting gang recruitment.
I. THE BURDEN ON CHILDREN RESISTING GANG RECRUITMENT TO PROVE
REFUGEE STATUS BASED ON MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Asylum requires an applicant to prove that he or she meets the statutory
definition of a refugee.36 A grant of asylum is discretionary,37 and is only
available if the applicant satisfies four elements: the applicant has a subjective
fear of persecution, the fear is well-founded, the persecution is based on one or
more of the five protected grounds, and the applicant is unable or unwilling to
return to his home country because of that persecution.38
A. Interpreting Congressional Silence: Defining the Elements of Asylum
The terms “fear of persecution,” “on account of . . . membership in a
particular social group,” and “unable or unwilling” all figure prominently in
the statutory definition of refugee, but lack separate and precise definitions.39

36. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the
requirements and procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney
General under this section if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.”
(emphasis added)).
38. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text; see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
218–19 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987). If an applicant can establish past persecution, the
asylum officer and immigration judge must presume that the applicant has a well-founded fear of
future persecution. See id. The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence, showing that changed circumstances in the applicant’s home country have vitiated the
applicant’s well-founded fear or that relocation within that country would alleviate that fear. Id.
For example, this presumption would be rebutted if an applicant claimed past persecution by a
past communist regime, but the regime no longer existed in the present day. E.g., N-M-A-, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 312, 314–15 (B.I.A. 1998) (explaining the applicant was ineligible for asylum because
his fear of persecution by Afghanistan’s communist government disappeared after the regime was
toppled).
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
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This congressional silence consequently requires the Board and various courts
of appeals to interpret their meanings.40
1. An Applicant’s Motivation for Seeking Asylum Must Be Based on a “Fear
of Persecution”
Whether premised on incidents that occurred in the past or those that are
likely to occur in the future, an applicant’s need for asylum must stem from a
fear of being persecuted in his or her home country.41 Congress, however, has
never defined “fear of persecution.”42 In the absence of express legislative
direction, the Board and federal circuit courts have attempted to interpret the
meaning of this phrase.43
In the matter of Acosta, the Board contemplated at length what constitutes a
“fear of persecution.”44 The Board determined that a genuine “fear” of facing
persecution in one’s home country must be the “primary motivation” of an
asylum seeker.45 The Board then defined “persecution” as “suffering or harm
[inflicted upon an individual] in order to punish an individual for possessing a
belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.”46 In defining the term,
the Board also suggested the level of harm or suffering required to prove
Based on prior case law, the Board explained that
“persecution.”47
confinement, torture, and severe economic deprivations or restrictions may rise
to the level of persecution, but found that generalized conditions of hardship or
violence, especially those shared by a common population, do not.48
This general definition has since been narrowed through subsequent
case-by-case interpretation. For example, the Third Circuit in Fatin v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service recognized that “persecution” does not
include all that American society considers unjust or unlawful; rather, the term
must be limited to extreme conduct to prevent an extraordinary number of
individuals from qualifying for asylum.49 Because the United States cannot
serve as a refuge for so many applicants, the court reasoned that Congress
40. See infra Part I.A.1–3.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
42. Id.; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220.
43. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222–23 (discussing how the term “persecution” has been
construed by various courts).
44. Id. at 221.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 222.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that if America’s standards of
fairness and constitutionality are applied to the term “persecution,” then “a significant percentage
of the world’s population would qualify for asylum in [the United States]—and it seems most
unlikely that Congress intended such a result”). The Third Circuit also clarified that subjective
fear of persecution alone is insufficient to establish asylum, suggesting that the fear must be
objectively reasonable. Id. at 1241 n.11.
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likely intended a much narrower interpretation that is commensurate with
extreme conduct.50 Isolated incidents of verbal harassment,51 threats other than
those directed against life or freedom,52 and trivial attempts at intimidation53
are acts that other courts deemed insufficient to be considered “persecution”
within the extreme-conduct standard set forth in Fatin.
The decision by the First Circuit in Nelson v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service illustrates the difficulty of meeting the extreme-conduct standard.54 In
Nelson, the female asylum applicant claimed that she experienced past
persecution through a combination of solitary confinement, physical abuse, and
harassment.55 Despite the applicant’s repeated exposure to maltreatment, the
court concluded that, although these incidents were unfortunate, occasional
detention and physical harm did not warrant classification as persecution.56
Although the applicant in Nelson fell short of proving persecution, others
have managed to satisfy the extreme-conduct requirement. For example, the
applicant in Lukwago v. Ashcroft alleged repeated threats and beatings coupled
with severe psychological trauma from forced confinement and exposure to
murder; the Third Circuit found this treatment commensurate with
persecution.57 Five years later, in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, the Eighth Circuit
found that an applicant who suffered a combination of physical beatings,
psychological distress, actual property confiscation, and threats of forced
marriage could successfully prove past persecution.58
These decisions demonstrate that to prove a “fear of persecution” an
applicant must, at a minimum, exhibit an objectively reasonable fear of a
persecutor’s threatened or actual extreme conduct.59 The conduct may cause
50. See id. at 1240 n.10.
51. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding
“menacing telephone calls” and verbal threats directed at the applicant and her family insufficient
to meet the requisite standard for persecution).
52. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that persecution
must constitute real threats to life or freedom).
53. See Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2008) (declaring that
“low-level intimidation and harassment” are excluded from the definition of persecution (quoting
Al Yatim v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2008))).
54. 232 F.3d 258, 264–65 (1st Cir. 2000).
55. Id. at 264 (stating the applicant experienced three bouts of solitary confinement and
multiple instances of abuse and harassment, including threatening phone calls and surveillance).
56. Id. (recognizing that the applicant was indeed mistreated, but finding that the
mistreatment did not extend far beyond “harassment and annoyance”).
57. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 169–70 (describing the repeated physical and psychological abuse
endured by the applicant as well as his forced exposure to the murder of his parents, and “the
killing and physical torture of his fellow captives, innocent civilians, and government soldiers”).
58. Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1036–37 (remanded to the Board to determine whether the
non-physical actions of the applicant’s in-laws constituted past persecution).
59. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text; see also Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168, 170
(finding that a combination of threats, beatings, and psychological trauma rose to the level of
persecution).
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physical or psychological harm, but the behavior must pose a genuine threat to
the applicant’s life or freedom to satisfy the requirements of persecution.60
2. The Persecution that an Applicant Fears Must Be “on Account of”
Membership in a Particular Social Group
Experiencing general harm or suffering does not establish asylum
eligibility.61 Rather, persecutors must inflict the requisite harm or suffering on
the applicant in retaliation for a “belief or characteristic [that the applicant has
which the] persecutor seeks to overcome.”62 This belief or characteristic must
fall into one of the five protected grounds to be eligible for asylum.63 To prove
that the feared persecution is on account of the applicant’s membership in a
PSG, the applicant must: (1) identify an appropriate PSG; (2) prove
membership in the identified PSG; and (3) demonstrate a nexus between that
membership and the applicant’s persecution.64
Read literally, the statutory language would permit any two individuals to
qualify as a PSG. To avoid this unintended result, certain limiting factors
developed in the PSG analysis. Similar to the development of “fear of
persecution,” the Board’s decision in Acosta also marked the starting point for

60. See supra notes 49–58.
61. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (B.I.A. 1987) (“[F]earing retribution over
purely personal matters, or aliens fleeing general conditions of violence and upheaval in their
countries, would not qualify for asylum.”).
62. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 223 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987); see also Amilcar-Orellana
v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting the applicant’s appeal because the
court agreed with the Board that the applicant’s past persecution was based on personal vendettas
two gang members had against the applicant for providing the police with information about an
arson the gang members started, not on his membership in a PSG of informants). The Ninth
Circuit has rejected the Board’s definition of “persecution” from Acosta to the extent that it
requires proof of the persecutors’ subjective intent to punish the applicant, explaining a
persecutor’s intent does not make the harm any less painful to the victim. See Pitcherskaia v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). In 2010, the Ninth
Circuit clarified that the motivation of the “persecutors” is important, however, to determining
whether there is a nexus between the alleged conduct and a protected ground. Zetino v. Hodler,
622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Grava v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 205
F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that persecutors are able to have mixed
motives, which does not weaken the basis for asylum if the causal connection or nexus is there to
begin with).
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). A causal connection must exist, establishing a
nexus between the applicant’s membership in a PSG and the harm that he or she fears. See, e.g.,
Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that because the
applicant was harmed before the alleged gang recruitment, no causal connection existed between
resisting the gang’s efforts and the persecution suffered); Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (“An alien’s
desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).
64. See Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993);
supra note 63.
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interpretation of the phrase “membership in a particular social group.”65
Although Congress did not define membership in a PSG,66 the Board
recognized that the four other protected grounds—race, religion, nationality,
and political opinion—all shared a commonality of being “immutable
characteristics.”67 The Board reasoned that these grounds are immutable
because they are either impossible to change or are so fundamental to an
individual’s identity that he or she should not be required to change it.68 The
Board then extended this immutability by implication to the meaning of
membership in a PSG.69
In addition to immutability, the Third Circuit in Lukwago v. Ashcroft
concluded that the PSG must exist even in the absence of the claimed
persecution.70 More recently, in C-A-, the Board added that members of a PSG
must be “socially visible,” meaning that they must have characteristics that
make them recognizable within their society,71 and that the group must be
described with “particularity.”72 However, members of a PSG are neither
required to associate with one another nor required to have anything in
common aside from their immutable characteristics.73

65. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; see, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239–40 (using the Board’s
decision in Acosta as a starting point for interpreting the phrase “particular social group”).
66. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232.
67. Id. at 233 (applying ejusdem generis, a doctrine stating that general words enumerated
in conjunction with specific words should be interpreted similarly to those specific words, to
determine the meaning of “particular social group” in relation to the other enumerated protected
grounds).
68. Id.
69. Id. Compare id. (noting that the immutable characteristic shared by members of the
group might be “sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstnaces it might be a shared past
experience”), with A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 71 (B.I.A. 2007) (affirming the immigration
judge’s decision based on the reasoning that being wealthy is a changeable trait and therefore not
immutable).
70. 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003).
71. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006). Some believe this is a misreading of
the guidelines set forth by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See Gatimi v.
Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[The standard of social visibility] makes no sense;
nor has the Board attempted in this or any other case to explain the reasoning behind the criterion
of social visibility.”); Email from Anonymous Immigration Judge to author (Feb. 9, 2011, 09:51
EST) (on file with author) (“[T]he B.I.A. (and some courts) twisted the ‘social visibility’ factor to
restrict, rather than expand protection as the [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] intended.”).
Publications by the UNHCR are not binding on the U.S. government; however, they are
persuasive and should help “steer the adjudication” of asylum claims. See Andrew Morton
& Wendy A. Young, Children Asylum Seekers Face Challenges in the United States, 20 REFUGE
13, 17–18 (2002).
72. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957 (rejecting the proposed PSG of “noncriminal informants”
as “too loosely defined”).
73. Id. at 956–57. Despite its opponents, several circuits have “gradually approved ‘social
visibiliy’ as a criterion” in the PSG analysis. Id. at 616 (citing to decisions by the First, Second,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
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Asylum applicants claiming membership in groups deemed “too
amorphous” will be rejected.74 However, in decisions such as A-M-E-, the
Board has alluded to the possibility of constructing a PSG using a typically
amorphous characteristic if that characteristic can be more specifically defined
under particular circumstances.75 The Eighth Circuit, in Ngengwe, further
cautioned that an overly narrow PSG would also be rejected.76 Although an
overly narrow PSG may describe why one individual experiences persecution,
the constricted description defeats the creation of a “group.”77
As discussed, qualifying for asylum on account of membership in a
particular social group is challenging. First, an applicant must identify an
immutable characteristic.78 Second, an applicant must construct a PSG around
their immutable characteristic that is neither too broad nor too narrow.79
Finally, an applicant must show that he or she is a member of this precisely
defined group, and that he or she has been persecuted or “has a well-founded
fear of persecution” on account of membership in this group.80
3. Asylum Must Be an Applicant’s Last Hope for Shelter from an “Unable
or Unwilling” State of Origin
When an applicant can prove that the persecution they fear is on account of
membership in a PSG, the final hurdle entails proving that their home country
cannot or will not supply relief from the harm.81 This most often arises in one
of two circumstances; either the home country’s government is the

74. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting “wealthy” as a
sufficiently particular immutable characteristic because it is a term that depends on personal
perspective for definitional limits, and one’s wealth may change from day to day). An asserted
PSG will be deemed “amorphous,” if the terms defining that PSG are subject to varying
interpretations, thereby preventing a common understanding of the group’s composition. Id. at
585.
75. See, e.g., A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75 n.6 (B.I.A. 2007). For example, “wealth” as
the only shared characteristic of a PSG is too amorphous because “the concept of wealth is so
indeterminate.” Id. at 76. However, “should a government institute a policy of imprisoning and
mistreating persons with assets or income above a fixed level,” the proposed PSG would more
clearly delineate members from nonmembers based on unchanging characteristics. Id. at 75 n.6.
76. Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that society would
not realistically perceive an overly narrow collection of characteristics as a distinct social group).
77. Id. (“[A] widowed Cameroonian female member of the Bamileke tribe, in the Southern
region that belongs to a family or has in-laws from a different tribe and region . . . who have
falsely accused her of causing her husband’s death” identifies only one person’s situation—not
that of a group).
78. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987).
79. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
80. Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
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persecutor,82 or the government cannot or will not control non-governmental
persecutors.83 The statute denotes this requirement as an inability or
unwillingness of an applicant to avail himself or herself of protection.84
Once again, the Board’s decision in Acosta led the way in defining the
language of the statute.85 In Acosta, the Board determined that to receive
asylum, the threat of persecution to an applicant must be countrywide.86
Additionally, the regulations require that asylum be denied if relocation
anywhere within one’s home country would provide a safe option, and such
internal relocation would be a reasonable expectation under the
The Ninth Circuit, in Cardenas v. Immigration
circumstances.87
& Naturalization Service, asserted that the relocation must offer more than a
temporary “post-threat harmless period.”88
B. Previously Rejected PSGs Relative to Children Resisting Gang Recruitment
To maintain their influence over urban areas in Central America,89 gangs are
forcibly recruiting neighborhood children under the age of twelve.90 Gangs
recognize the vulnerability of these children due to their young age91 and
82. See Llana-Castellon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 16 F.3d 1093, 1098, 1100
(10th Cir. 1994) (revising and remanding the Board’s decision to overrule the immigration
judge’s finding of a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the Sandista government).
83. See id. at 1097; see also Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 442 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[The
applicant] assert[ed] that . . . gang members would torture him with the awareness—or willful
blindness—of government officials.”); Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“An applicant must show the government’s acquiescence in the persecutor’s acts or its inability
or unwillingness to investigate and punish those acts, and not just a general difficulty preventing
the occurrence of particular future crimes.”). The home government’s efforts or lack thereof must
rise to the level of mistreatment because no government can provide absolute protection to all of
its citizens. Keiser, 505 F.3d. at 42–43.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
85. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987).
86. Id.
87. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(ii) (2006).
88. 294 F.3d 1062, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002). Otherwise, the Cardenas court concluded,
relocation amounts to nothing more than a small hurdle for persecutors to overcome in reaching
their target. See id.
89. Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 376–78 (discussing the prevalence of gangs in urban
Central America).
90. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7–8; McGuire, supra note 8, at 2.
91. See David E. Arredondo, Principles of Child Development and Juvenile Justice:
Information for Decision-Makers, 5 J. CTR. FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 127, 127 (2004) (observing that
juveniles are “still in the process of neurobiological, psychological, social, and moral
development” and thus are very sensitive to environmental influences). Adolescents are
especially susceptible to gang demands because their brains cause them to act impulsively and
instinctively in emotionally charged situations. See id. at 129. Adults would be less susceptible
to gang recruitment, on the other hand, because they use the part of their brain associated with
reason to process emotionally charged decisions. See id.
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economic disadvantage.92 Gangs also target children under twelve, who are
generally immune from prosecution under the laws of El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras.93 Furthermore, a lack of alternatives makes gang recruitment
an enticing option for young adolescents.94
Children who resist gang recruitment often find themselves in dangerous
situations.95 Gangs see resistance to their demands as a sign of disrespect,
punishable by harsh treatment.96 The violence subsides only if the child finally
agrees to join the gang,97 the gang abandons efforts to recruit the child and
decides to kill the child instead,98 or the child is able to relocate safely out of
the gang’s reach.99
Central American states such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have
attempted to control gang violence through harsh social-cleansing practices
known as mano dura, which target suspected gang members.100 However,
92. See supra notes 11, 18 and accompanying text; see also USAID, CENTRAL AMERICA
MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT 15 (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations
/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs_assessment.pdf (stating several risk factors that make
children susceptible to joining a gang, including poor economic situations and limited access to
jobs or educational opportunities).
93. Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 237 (noting that in these countries, children under the age of
twelve cannot be legally tried as adults, and generally the highest penalty available upon capture
is having their parent or guardian notified). Furthermore, children under the age of twelve are
afforded special protections from legal liability and exploitation. Id. at 247. By recruiting young
children to carry out illegal activities, these loopholes allow gangs to avoid the legal
consequences of getting caught. See id. at 237–47. See also Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F.
App’x 202, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We are cognizant of extensive gang activity in El Salvador
and also of the gang’s despicable practice of recruiting young children to commit crimes.”);
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that
young gang members engage in illegal activities like drug trafficking and murder).
94. See Corsetti, supra note 12, at 413–14.
95. See supra note 1 (providing examples of threats that resistance to gang recruitment
yields).
96. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text; see also Guidance Note on Refugee
Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 22 (stating that threats and violence are the primary methods gangs
employ to coerce an individual to join the gang).
97. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 287 (noting that the gang members who attacked
the applicant screamed, “Don’t run. Don’t be afraid. Sooner or later you will join us.”);
S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580 (B.I.A. 2008) (describing persistant threats to the applicants’
lives if they continued to resist recruitment).
98. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 287 (highlighting the applicant’s testimony
that the gang told him they would no longer offer membership and they were going to kill him
instead); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580.
99. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 53–54 (discussing the option of
relocating to evade persecution and noting the often expansive reach of gangs, which—when
country- or region-wide—can render internal relocation ineffective); see supra note 1 (providing
examples of asylum seekers fleeing from gang persecution); see also, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez,
502 F.3d 287 (involving an applicant who fled to the United States from Honduras because of
gang threats).
100. See, e.g., Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 9 (noting that these mano
dura policies target suspected gang members for unlawful arrests, police violence, and
AND
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these efforts have been counterproductive; gangs have adapted to these policies
with increased organization and decreased visibility, resulting in minimal
improvement to public security.101 As a result, the police offer little protection
to children targeted for recruitment.102 Because most gangs have country-wide
networks, adequate relocation often requires finding a safe haven in another
country.103 Children seeking refuge from gang recruitment commonly apply
for asylum in the United States.104
1. The Companion Cases of S-E-G- and E-A-G-: Children Resisting Gang
Recruitment Are Not Eligible for Asylum
Striking a delicate balance between a group that is neither overly broad nor
exceedingly narrow is essential to crafting an appropriate PSG.105 In 2008, the
Board decided, in companion cases S-E-G- and E-A-G-, that PSGs involving
children resisting gang recruitment were too amorphous to warrant a grant of
asylum because they lacked the social-visibility requirement.106 To date, no
published opinion has granted asylum to a child who has resisted gang
recruitment based on a PSG analysis.107
extrajudicial killings); see also McGuire, supra note 8, at 3–5 (criticizing the mano dura policies
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as highly ineffective).
101. BARNES, supra note 22, at 2; McGuire, supra note 8, at 4.
102. See supra note 22; see also McGuire, supra note 8, at 4 (observing that the police have
lost control and often target youths in general for punishment associated with gang activities).
103. See, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 580 (describing the testimony of a professor at
Central American University about the improbability of relocating in a small country like El
Salvador because a gang’s influence can extend to every corner of the country).
104. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 2 (“During recent years, an
increasing number of claims have been made especially in . . . the United States of America,
notably by young people from Central America who fear persecution at the hands of violent
gangs in their countries of origin.”).
105. See supra notes 76–79, 82 and accompanying text.
106. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593–96 (B.I.A. 2008); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 588.
107. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 443–44 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the PSG
consisting of “young, Americanized, well-off, Salvadoran male deportee with a criminal history
who opposes gangs”); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting the PSG
defined as “young Guatemalan men recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment”);
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the PSG identified
as “Salvadoran males between the ages of eight and fifteen who have been recruited but who do
not wish to belong to a gang”); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the PSG articulated as “young Honduran men who have been recruited by the MS-13,
but who refuse to join”); Cruz-Alvarez v. Holder, 320 F.App’x 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting
the PSG defined as “children targeted for recruitment into gangs”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,
542 F.3d 738, 741, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the PSG described as “the class of young
men in El Salvador who resist the violence and intimidation of gang rule”), abrogated in party by
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12 (9th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2007) (declining to decide whether “young
Honduran men who have been actively recruited by gangs and who have refused to join the
gangs” is a PSG because the petition was denied for lack of a causal nexus to a protected ground);
E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594 (rejecting the PSG articulated as “persons resistant to gang

2012]

Particular Social Groups for Children Resisting Gang Recruitment

637

In S-E-G-, two male children from El Salvador were denied asylum after
claiming persecution on account of membership in a PSG defined as
“Salvadoran youth who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang.”108
After the boys were beaten for refusing to join MS-13, the gang members told
them that further refusal might result in “their bodies end[ing] up in a
dumpster.”109 Before leaving El Salvador, the applicants’ fears intensified
when they learned that another boy in the neighborhood was shot and killed
after refusing the same gang’s recruitment efforts.110
Relying on the definition of “particular social group” set forth in Acosta and
focusing on the terms “social visibility” and “particularity” emphasized in
C-A-, the Board found that the asserted PSG—“Salvadoran youth who refused
recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang”—was too amorphous.111
According to the Board, the PSG, as articulated by the applicants, lacked
sufficient particularity because it encompassed a “large and diffuse” portion of
society and the motivations of the gang members to target youth varied.112 The
Board questioned whether the gangs limited their recruitment to children with
shared characteristics of economic disadvantages and proximity to MS-13
central areas, or whether these characteristics merely made them easier
targets.113 The Board also failed to recognize a “socially visible” group
because no evidence indicated that gangs or society in general perceived youth
refusing recruitment as an identifiable group.114 It found little distinction
between the way gangs targeted the applicants compared to the Salvadorian
public.115 Despite contrary guidance from the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR),116 the Board based their denial of asylum on the
observation that the harm the applicants faced was no more severe than the
harm anyone else in El Salvador would encounter if they defied a gang’s
wishes.117
membership”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 590 (rejecting the PSG defined as “Salvadoran youth
who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang”).
108. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579, 590.
109. Id. at 580.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 582–83, 590; see supra Part I.A.2 (using case law that defined “particular social
group,” “social visibility,” and “particularity”).
112. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585–86.
113. Id. at 585.
114. Id. at 586–87.
115. Id. at 587.
116. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35 (noting that a group need not
experience a higher incidence of targeting than the general public to qualify as a PSG); see also
infra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (explaining the guidance given by the UNHCR on this
matter).
117. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587–88 (explaining that because gang violence invades
almost all aspects of Salvadoran life, violence is not limited to those who resist recruitment
efforts); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text (stating that generalized harm and
suffering do not warrant asylum).
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Although it involved a very different fact pattern, the companion case,
E-A-G-, similarly found that the named PSG did not warrant a grant of
asylum.118 In E-A-G-, the applicant declined his cousin’s invitation to join a
gang, but he was not directly threatened or harmed in response.119 The
applicant’s family received threats from people whom the applicant believed to
be gang members, but he could not confirm gang members were responsible,
nor did he know why his family was being threatened.120 Nonetheless, the
immigration judge found the applicant to be a member of the PSG defined as
“persons resistant to gang membership.”121 The Board disagreed and focused
heavily on the PSG’s lack of social visibility: “[t]here is no showing that
[persons who resist joining gangs] are of concern to anyone in Honduras . . . or
that . . . [they] are seen as a segment of the population in any meaningful
respect.”122
Subsequent circuit court decisions, such as Ramos-Lopez v. Holder and
Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, frequently cite to these two companion cases to
uphold the conclusion that PSGs pertaining to children resisting gang
recruitment are too amorphous and lack social visibility.123 In Ramos-Lopez,
the Ninth Circuit suggested that a shared experience of gang recruitment is too
broad and diverse to stand as the only commonality among individuals in an
articulated group.124 Furthermore, agreeing with S-E-G-,125 the court in
Santos-Lemus held that resistors are not eligible for asylum because gang
violence is so widespread in Central America that the general population is
exposed to the same harm.126

118. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593 (B.I.A. 2008).
119. Id. at 592.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id. at 594–95 (explaining that the PSG was not “socially visible,” and lacked any
identifiable characteristics, thus precluding asylum).
123. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (using the companion cases
to conclude that the applicant did not assert an eligible PSG in “young Salvadoran men refusing
gang recruitment efforts”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 2008) (using
S-E-G- to conclude that the asserted PSG of “young [men] in El Salvador resisting gang violence
unstoppable by the police” was not socially visible and even less particular than the PSG
considered in S-E-G-), abrogated in part by Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12
(9th Cir. 2009).
124. See Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862. Shortly after deciding Ramos-Lopez, the Ninth
Circuit confirmed its reasoning. See Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the applicant’s argument because it was indistinguishable from that proposed in
Ramos-Lopez).
125. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 587–88 (B.I.A. 2008) (explaining that gang violence
“affects all segments of” El Salvador).
126. See, e.g., Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 746 (rejecting the asserted PSG, in part for its lack
of social visibility, because the asserted harassment was merely a part of “general community and
civil unrest,” rather than a specific targeting of PSG members).
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A recent decision from the First Circuit summarized the major reasons that
PSGs premised on resisting gang recruitment have been rejected.127 In Larios
v. Holder the court rejected the asserted PSG of “young Guatemalan men
recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment.”128 The court agreed
with the immigration judge that the gang targeted the applicant in a general
attempt to increase the gang’s numbers rather than on account of the
applicant’s membership in the PSG.129 The court first reasoned that the PSG
was not socially visible because it lacked recognizable characteristics to make
it stand out in the community as a distinct group;130 also, the PSG was not
sufficiently particular because the ambiguity of the terms used to define the
PSG made discerning members from non-members “virtually impossible.”131
As indicated by S-E-G- and E-A-G-, the Board believes that PSGs
concerning “resistance to gang recruitment” should be rejected as overly broad,
amorphous, and lacking in social visibility.132 Without a PSG that sufficiently
articulates an immutable characteristic, showcases particularity, and
exemplifies social visibility, courts will continue to deny asylum to individuals
who resist gang recruitment.133
II. THE MATTER OF L.R.: DHS PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON ARTICULATING
ACCEPTABLE PSGS
Similar to the treatment of asylum claims from children resisting gang
recruitment, immigration judges and the Board regularly denied asylum to
victims of domestic abuse until recently.134 On August 4, 2010, after
considering the position advocated by DHS in a supplemental brief to the
Board, an immigration judge on remand granted asylum to a Mexican woman
127. See Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105–09 (1st Cir. 2010).
128. Id. at 108–09.
129. Id. at 109. But see Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 285,
291 (3d Cir. 2007) (“No reasonable factfinder could conclude that [the applicant] was attacked for
any reason other than his status as a young Honduran man who had been recruited to join [a] gang
and refused to join.”).
130. Larios, 608 F.3d at 109 (citing Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26–27 (1st Cir.
2010)).
131. Id. at 109 (“There are . . . questions about who may be considered ‘young,’ the type of
conduct that may be considered ‘recruit[ment],’ and the degree to which a person must display
‘resist[ance].’ These are ambiguous group characteristics, largely subjective, that fail to establish
a sufficient level of particularity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at
27)).
132. See supra notes 102–22 and accompanying text.
133. Cf. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that
deference is given to the Board’s published decisions when dealing with ambiguous terms in the
Immigation and Naturalization Act (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908–12
(9th Cir. 2009))).
134. See Preston, supra note 32, at A14 (recognizing that the grant of asylum in the matter of
L.R. brought “new clarity to asylum law after almost 15 years of arcane and tangled litigation,
when [asylum] claims from domestic abuse victims were regularly dismissed”).
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known as “L.R.” based on her membership in a PSG premised on domestic
violence 135 The result for L.R. indicates a significant progression in PSG
analyses.136 DHS’s proposed alternatives for asserting PSGs in L.R. are of
equal significance to the formulation of new PSGs outside of the
domestic-violence context.137
A. The Facts Underlying the Matter of L.R.
L.R., a female applicant from Mexico, suffered severe long-term abuse at the
hands of her common-law husband.138 The two had lived together with their
three children.139 Over the course of several decades, L.R.’s husband regularly
raped her and threatened her with weapons140 because, according to L.R., her
husband believed that he owned L.R. by virtue of his dominant position in their
relationship.141 L.R. tried to escape captivity numerous times; once when she
was two months pregnant, her husband caught her, locked her in a room, and
tried to burn her alive.142 L.R. could not safely relocate to another part of
Mexico because her husband used the Internet to track her down.143 The police
offered L.R. no protection—“[s]he would show the police her bruises and
135. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. The applicant is known only by her
initials because asylum cases are kept confidental. See Preston, supra note 32, at A14; supra note
32.
136. Amy Lieberman, Is Domestic Violence Cause for US to Grant Asylum?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/02101/is-domesticviolence-cause-for-US-to-grant-asylum (reporting that DHS’s supplemental brief and the grant of
asylum to L.R. signal a policy shift in the United States’ approach to victims of domestic violence
seeking asylum). As an example of previous policies, the Board squarely denied asylum to a
Guatemalan victim of domestic violence in the matter of R-A-. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906,
927–28 (B.I.A. 1999). The applicant claimed membership in the PSG of “Guatemalan women
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women
are to live under male domination.” Id. at 911. According to an attorney at the center for Gender
and Refugee Studies (CGRS), the grant rates for asylum cases involving domestic violence have
significantly increased since L.R. because many judges now feel more confident granting these
petitions. Lieberman, supra (quoting Lisa Frydman, senior attorney at CGRS).
137. See infra Part III; see also Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (noting that DHS’s analysis is
not limited to domestic violence and can be applied broadly to gender-based claims).
138. See Preston, supra note 32, at A14. CGRS, a group that represented L.R. during part of
her struggle to gain asylum in the United States, asserts that L.R. did not voluntarily choose this
man to be her common-law husband. Matter of L.R., supra note 27. L.R. met her common-law
husband when she was at a teacher training school in Mexico, where he was the school’s sports
coach. Id. He was almost fifteen years her senior and raped her at gunpoint. Id. Afterward, he
made L.R. his prisoner for two decades using violence and death threats. Id.
139. Matter of L.R., supra note 27. These three children were conceived because L.R.’s
husband raped her. See supra note 33.
140. Preston, supra note 32, at A14.
141. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15.
142. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 10 (explaining that L.R. was a teacher, and had to
register her personal information online each time she relocated).
143. Id. at 26–27.
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injuries, but the police [would not help her because her husband’s abuse was a]
private [matter] and her life was not in danger.”144
L.R. first filed for asylum in the United States in December 2005.145 An
immigration judge denied her asylum claim in 2007.146 L.R. appealed this
decision to the Board, which then requested supplemental briefing from the
applicant and DHS.147 Upon a joint motion, the matter was remanded to the
immigration judge for further fact finding.148
B. Acceptable PSG Formulations for Victims of Domestic Violence
DHS’s supplemental brief expressed the agency’s position on whether
victims of domestic violence can establish themselves as a “particular social
group” for purposes of asylum eligibility.149 DHS intended the brief to serve
as a guide for asylum claims, and set forth PSG formulations that could qualify
applicants for asylum.150 DHS proposed two alternative PSGs that would be
acceptable for victims of domestic violence.151
When L.R. initially applied for asylum, her proposed PSG was “Mexican
women in an abusive domestic relationship who are unable to leave.”152 DHS
quickly disposed of this proposal in its entirety as circular, because the
immutable characteristic of the PSG cannot be the same as the persecution
feared, which, in this case, would be abuse in a domestic relationship.153
144. Id. at 11–12. Furthermore, police officers told L.R.’s husband that L.R. had
complained, causing her husband to retaliate against L.R. with more servere beatings and
punishment. Id. at 12. L.R. even contacted a Mexican judge for protection, but the judge only
offered to help in exchange for sexual favors. Id. at 16–17. L.R. refused. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 1. However, this was not the first time L.R. attempted to come to the United
States. Id. at 12–13. She first fled to the United States in 1991, but her husband found her and
threatened to take the children and kill her family if she did not return to his household. Id. She
returned to Mexico in 1993, but he continued to physically and verbally abuse her and the
children. Id. at 21. L.R. realized that he would not stop until he killed her; therefore, she fled to
the United States with the children in 2004. Id. She did not immediately seek asylum because of
the psychological trauma that decades of abuse wrought. Id. at 21–22.
146. See supra note 33. The immigration judge found that she was barred from asylum
because her claim was not timely (an issue which is not relevant to this Note), and her past
persecution did not satisfy any of the protected grounds for asylum; rather, the judge found that
the beatings were merely a result of her husband’s violent nature. Matter of L.R., supra note 27.
147. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 2–3.
148. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 2–3; see also supra note 33.
149. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 4.
150. Id. at 5 (“[I]n order to contribute to a process leading to the creation of better guidance
to both adjudicators and litigants, the Department will offer here alternative formulations of
‘particular social group[s]’ that could, in appropriate cases, qualify aliens for asylum . . . .”).
151. Id. at 14.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 10–11 (explaining that L.R.’s proposed PSG was fatally flawed because the
“abusive domestic relationship” was not only the immutable characteristic of the PSG, but also
the persecution that L.R. feared). DHS, agreeing with the UNCHR, concluded that permitting
this circular logic would be the equivalent of declaring that persecution no longer has to be on
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Hence, DHS constructed new PSGs using the definition of “particular social
group” set out in the matter of Acosta and clarified through subsequent case
law, emphasizing the more recently identified elements of “social visibility”
and “particularity” from C-A-.154 DHS concluded that L.R. could qualify for
one of two acceptable PSGs upon remand: (1) “Mexican women in domestic
relationships who are unable to leave”; or (2) “Mexican women who are
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic
relationship.”155
III. USING THE PSGS ARTICULATED IN THE MATTER OF L.R. TO CREATE A PSG
FOR RESISTING GANG RECRUITMENT
Although the immigration judge did not issue a written opinion explaining
the merits of L.R.’s asylum application, one must infer from the grant that L.R.
satisfied each of the requisite elements: (1) identifying a particular social
group; (2) establishing her membership in the identified PSG; (3) proving a
“well-founded” fear of persecution on account of her membership in the PSG;
and (4) illustrating that she would not be safe from her persecutor by relocating
within Mexico.156 Satisfying elements two, three, and four requires application
of the asylum seeker’s particular facts to the legal rules set forth in the above
discussions of the law; however, this factual analysis is predicated on the
establishment of a visible PSG, which is solely a legal determination.157
Because DHS focused on the legal principles of constructing PSGs without
focusing on a particular set of facts, the analytical framework that DHS used in

account of one of the five protected grounds. Id. at 6 (reasoning that this circular logic equates to
a PSG of “individuals [that] are targeted for persecution because they belong to a group of
individuals who are targeted for persecution”).
154. Id. at 7–21; see supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the elements of appropriate PSGs as defined
through case law).
155. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 14–15. DHS noted that this was not an
exhaustive list of possible PSG formulations for victims of domestic violence because much
depends on a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 11 n.9.
156. See Order of the Immigration Judge, supra note 33; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2006); supra Part.I.A (explaining these elements of establishing refugee status using membership
in a PSG as the protected ground). This inference is appropriate because the regulations place the
affirmative burden on the applicant to prove each element to establish eligibility for asylum. See
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2011). According to the CGRS, which represented L.R. in this matter,
DHS submitted a filing to the judge and agreed, after reviewing L.R.’s response brief, that L.R.
was eligible for asylum. Matter of L.R., supra note 27.
157. See S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580–81 (B.I.A. 2008) (explaining that before
analyzing whether the applicant has demonstrated that he or she satisfies the elements of asylum,
the Board must address whether the applicant has identified a PSG that is recognized under the
law); see also Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that although
assessing the visibility of an asserted PSG requires a case-by-case analysis, PSGs must, in the
first instance, satisfy the appropriate legal standards), overruled in part by Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 425 (1987).
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L.R. may be applicable to scenarios beyond traditional domestic violence.158
In particular, the framework can be used to define a PSG for children resisting
gang recruitment.159
A. Immutable, Socially Visible, and Sufficiently Particular: Creating a PSG
for Children Resisting Gang Recruitment
Although individuals described as “women fearing harm on account of their
inability to escape a domestic relationship”160 and “children fearing harm on
account of their resistance to gang recruitment”161 may not seem to have a
common basis for asylum, the groupings can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
Asylum seekers can assert a PSG for children resisting gang recruitment by
following the same four-step analysis that DHS set forth in its supplemental
brief for the matter of L.R..162 Those asserting the PSG should define it as
“Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the age of twelve who
gang members in control of their neighborhood expect to acquiesce to gang
recruitment.”163
1. “Status Within a Relationship”: The Immutable Characteristic of the
PSG
As a starting point in its PSG analysis, DHS sought “to identify the specific
characteristic that the persecutor targets in choosing his victim.”164 DHS
identified the characteristic in L.R. as her subordinate status in the domestic
relationship with her common-law husband; he perceived L.R. as his property,
which he believed meant he had the right to abuse her.165
After identifying the specific characteristic targeted for persecution, the
applicant must show that the characteristic is immutable as set forth in
Acosta.166 DHS stated that a characteristic could be immutable if “economic,
social, physical, and other constraints” render leaving the relationship
impossible, or if the persecutor refuses to recognize an end to the relationship,
warranting a fear of future persecution.167 DHS recognized that L.R. satisfied
this requirement through her persecutor’s repeated abuse, which she could not

158. Matter of L.R., supra note 27 (discussing the potential for extending the framework
beyond domestic violence).
159. See infra Part III.A (creating a PSG for children resisting gang recruitment by utilizing
the logic found in L.R.).
160. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 14.
161. See supra note 109 (citing examples of asylum applicants asserting this PSG).
162. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15–21.
163. See infra Part III.A.1–3 (explaining why this PSG can provide a basis for asylum).
164. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15.
165. Id. at 15–16.
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id.
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escape even after leaving him multiple times.168 Therefore, L.R.’s subordinate
position in the relationship served as her immutable characteristic.169
Applying DHS’s logic in L.R., the shared characteristic of children who
resist gang recruitment is the “status” that these children occupy in the
relationship with their persecutors.170 The specific characteristic of these
children targeted by gangs is their subordinate status in relation to gang
members.171 In countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, children
have subordinate relationships to the gang members that control their
neighborhoods because of their vulnerability.172 Gang members perceive
at-risk children in the areas they control as subordinate to them because of their
vulnerability, and therefore target them for recruitment through force and
intimidation,173 Additionally, because gangs control those areas with at-risk
children, they expect them to fill the lowest ranks of the gang’s hierarchy,
further propagating their perception that these expected recruits are subordinate
to gang members.174
DHS’s analysis further proves the immutability of these children’s
subordinate status in relation to the gang members who recruit them. Expected
recruits who resist gang recruitment efforts can be likened to a woman in an
abusive relationship. The abusive husband in L.R. expected L.R. to comply
with his demands because he believed he “owned” L.R. by virtue of his role as
the dominant spousal figure.175 Similarly, gangs believe that these children
belong to them because the children reside in the neighborhoods that the gangs
control.176 This belief of control is exemplified when these children resist a
gang’s forcible recruitment, and gang members retaliate with threats,
harassment, and violence.177 DHS asserted that similar retaliation shows the
immutability of the subordinate status of domestic-violence victims who

168. Id.; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (explaining that after L.R.’s
response brief, DHS argued that she satisfied the requirement for asylum).
169. See Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 49–50 (asserting that L.R.’s status in her
domestic relationship was an immutable characteristic because her husband forced her into and
made her remain in the relationship, refusing to accept that the relationship was over).
170. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15.
171. See id.
172. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (emphasizing that gangs exploit these
children because of their social and economic disadvantages as well as other vulnerabilities).
173. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
174. See USAID, supra note 92, at 15 (observing that children “represent the lowest level of
the gang supply chain”).
175. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 15.
176. Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 42 (noting that when a gang
controls an area, its members will often target the children who live in the area for recruitment
merely because of their residency within the gang’s sphere of control).
177. See, e.g., supra note 1; see also supra notes 95–99 (describing gang responses to
individuals resisting recruitment).
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challenged their spouses’ perceived control.178 Therefore, like L.R., these
children cannot change their subordinate status because their persecutors—the
gangs that control their neighborhoods—refuse to accept that these children
resist recruitment.179
Additional aspects of the proposed PSG, such as the children’s ages,
locations, and vulnerability due to economic disadvantage also render their
subordinate status immutable.180 As set forth in DHS’s brief, when “economic,
social, physical, or other constraints [make] it impossible for the applicant to
leave the relationship during the period when the persecution [is] inflicted,” the
applicant’s status within the relationship may be immutable.181 Because many
Central American gangs have country- or region-wide influence, children
resisting gang recruitment may find their attempts to flee to another part of the
country to avoid retaliation futile.182 Furthermore, young, economically
deprived children, especially those without familial support, lack the ability
and resources to relocate on their own.183 These constraints render it
impossible for children resisting gang recruitment to change or escape their
position in their role as expected recruit in relation to the gang. Therefore, the
proposed PSG of “Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the
age of twelve who gang members in control of their neighborhoods expect to
acquiesce to gang recruitment” sets forth an appropriate immutable
characteristic of individuals in a subordinate position.184
2. Social Visibility Is Illustrated Through the Way the State and Society
Perceive Members of the PSG
Following the requirement articulated in C-A- that the PSG must be “socially
visible,”185 DHS’s analysis in L.R. asked whether society perceives the PSG as
a socially distinct group set apart by the members’ shared, immutable
178. Compare Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 6–15 (describing the abuse of L.R. at the
hands of her husband, including the increased punishments and threats L.R. received in retaliation
for her attempts to flee and notify the authorities), with supra note 1 (recounting experiences that
children have encountered after they resist gang recruitment).
179. See DHS Suppemental Brief, supra note 33, at 16.
180. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 36.
181. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 16.
182. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 53; see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text. For example, in some Central American countries, relocation is not a
realistic option because gangs have harnessed recent technological advancements, such as the
Internet and cellular phones, to extend and intensify their area of influence. Corsetti, supra note
12, at 410–11.
183. See McGuire, supra note 8, at 3.
184. This proposed PSG contains other characteristics that are also immutable. Nationality
cannot be changed. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. Although age does change
with the passage of time, it is still immutable because age can only be changed with time and not
to avoid persecution. Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 53 (stating that age
is immutable).
185. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
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characteristic.186 In its brief, DHS indicated that, upon further fact finding, the
subordinate status of women in domestically violent relationships could be
considered socially visible in Mexico through a showing that women in these
relationships are afforded less protection from harm due to their subordinate
status.187 In her response brief, L.R. asserted that in Mexico, female victims of
domestic violence are not afforded government protection from abuse
occurring within their domestic relationships.188 Because of this “base cultural
acceptance of violence against women,” L.R. concluded that women like
herself in violent domestic relationships were viewed as a segment not worthy
of police protection.189 Therefore, L.R.’s immutable characteristic, subordinate
status in a relationship, marked her as a member of a group that society
perceived differently from the general population. Because DHS agreed with
L.R. upon remand and the judge granted asylum, L.R.’s conclusion must have
successfully established social visibility for her proposed PSG.190
Children resisting gang recruitment may utilize the same rubric based upon
distinctions made by the state and the rest of society to prove social visibility.
In gang-controlled neighborhoods, where violence and criminal activity have
become the unchallenged norm, those who expressly oppose the gang’s wishes
are often a recognizable segment of the community.191 Because individuals
who oppose gangs risk violent retaliation or death,192 those living in
gang-controlled areas generally comply with gang demands instead of
jeopardizing the safety of themselves or their loved ones.193 Therefore,
persons in these societies who resist gang demands are in an identifiable
minority who “stand out [to and] from the rest of the community.”194
The minority status of child resistors, coupled with governmental responses
to gang violence, show a clear distinction between members of this PSG and
the rest of society.195 The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras have implemented “zero-tolerance,” or mano dura, policies to deal

186. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 17–18.
187. Id. This view was illustrated when police refused to rescue L.R. from her “private”
affairs. Id. at 17.
188. Applicant’s Brief, supra note 33, at 50.
189. Id. at 51–52 (quoting DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 18).
190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
191. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12.
192. Id. ¶ 6; see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 407.
193. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 10, 12; see also supra note 12.
194. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11–12 (observing that in contrast
to “ordinary people” exposed to gang activity, resistors are a “special group” specficially targeted
by gangs).
195. Cf. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 17–18 (explaining the state’s response
can be considered a reflection of society’s view about the members of a PSG); supra text
accompanying note 196.
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with the corruption of gangs.196 These policies, aimed at gang members,
consist of draconian social-cleansing practices,197 and have led to “the arrest
and detention of thousands of youth” believed to be gang members.198
Because children who resist gang recruitment cannot rightly be held as a part
of this massive detention if they have no gang associations, the state must be
able to distinguish between children who acquiesce to gang recruitment and
those who oppose it.199 Therefore, children who oppose gang recruitment are a
distinct segment of society. They are socially visible to their neighbors as a
minority class of youths that do not follow the status quo by acquiescing to
gang demands.200 They are also recognized as socially distinct by the state as
children who are not affiliated with gang activity.201
3. Ensuring that the PSG Is Sufficiently Particular by Clarifying Amorphous
Terms
The final part of DHS’s L.R. analysis focused on whether the proposed PSGs
were particular enough to “clearly delineate[] who is in the group.”202
Although asylum claims asserting the proposed PSG “Salvadoran,
Guatemalan, or Honduran children under the age of twelve who gang members
in control of their neighborhood expect to acquiesce to gang recruitment,”203
196. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 8, at 4; see also Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra
note 10, ¶ 9; supra notes 100–03 (discussing Central American governmental responses to
gangs). Mano dura have been referred to as the Central American governments’ “war on gangs.”
Jütersonke et al., supra note 8, at 10.
197. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12 (explaining that these mano
dura policies include “extrajudicial killing, police violence, arbitrary or unlawful arrests and
detention as well as inhumane prison conditions,” which are directed at those believed to be gang
members); see also MANZ, supra note 8, at 37 (concluding that these mano dura policies have
been ineffective in containing violence).
198. McGuire, supra note 8, at 4.
199. Cf. SEBASTIAN AMAR ET AL., supra note 25, at app.C at 45 (providing examples of
gang-related tattoos and other distinct gang markings). Gang members are often recognizable
within their societies. For example, in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United
States, the applicant knew the men who were harassing him were part of the gang Mara
Salvatrucha because of their tattoos. 502 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Orozco-Polanco,
No. A75-244-012, 2 (Immigration Ct., El Paso, Tex. Dec. 18, 1997) (“The El Bordo gang
members cultivate a distinctive appearance, wearing big pants, shaving their heads, and having
tattoos . . . . The members of [their] rival gang, which is called the Poporopes, dress like cowboys
and wear seven-inch belt buckles.”). The state relies on such visible indicia, along with other
signs demonstrating gang association, to differentiate between resistors and gang members and to
prosecute gang members under mano dura legislation. See Melissa Siskind, Guilt by Association:
Transnational Gangs and the Merits of a New Mano Dura, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 289,
305–05 (2008) (describing the statutory requirements for a group to be recognized and prosecuted
as a gang).
200. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 12.
201. See supra note 195.
202. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 18–21.
203. See supra text accompanying note 163.
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will still be subject to a case-by-case determination for asylum eligibility, the
template PSG satisfies the final requirement of particularity.204
DHS acknowledged in their supplemental brief potential concerns regarding
the particularity of its proposed PSGs.205 In particular, DHS noted that the
term “domestic relationship” might be considered amorphous.206 However,
DHS suggested that this phrase could be defined with sufficient particularity
by using the definition of “crime of domestic violence” found in U.S.
immigration law.207
The seemingly amorphous relationship between a “gang and expected gang
recruit” is defined in the proposed PSG with just as much particularity.208 The
expected recruit must be: (1) under twelve years old; (2) living in a
gang-controlled neighborhood of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras; and
(3) expected by gang members to acquiesce to gang recruitment.209 These
specifications permit clear differentiation between members of the PSG and
non-members because these elements do not entertain multiple
interpretations.210 The first two elements are clearly delineable characteristics
of age and nationality; the third element, although factually subjective and
requiring judgment as to who gangs expect to recruit, can be particularized
with the deeper analysis set forth above, explaining precisely the group of
vulnerable youths expected to join gangs.211
DHS also addressed overbreadth concerns, noting that the phrase “ability to
leave a relationship” could be fairly ambiguous and permit multiple
interpretations; however, DHS explained that applying the standard on a
case-by-case basis would yield sufficient particularity because each applicant
would apply the standard to his or her facts.212 This would allow the Board to
assess with particularity an applicant’s reasonable ability to leave the
relationship.213
Applying this portion of the analysis to children resisting gang recruitment,
members of the proposed PSG have a similar inability to leave their
204. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (emphasizing the requirement of
particularity).
205. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 19–20.
206. Id. at 19. This is likely because “domestic relationship” can refer to a number of living
situations in common parlance, including, but not limited to, roommates, married couples, and
same-sex partners.
207. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006)). Importantly, DHS intended to use this
statutory definition as an example of the potential for particularity, and did not intend it to be the
only way to characterize “domestic relationship.” Id.
208. See supra text accompanying note 163.
209. See supra text accompanying note 163.
210. Cf. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting a PSG because the court
found the terms of the PSG could be read to have mutiple meanings).
211. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text.
212. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 20.
213. Id. at 20 & n.14.
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relationships.214 For those who would argue that the PSG is overbroad, DHS’s
analysis found that some ambiguity does not trigger automatic rejection of the
PSG so long as the Board can assess the reasonableness of the applicant’s
claim with sufficient probability.215 Therefore, the Board should assess each
child’s asylum claim on its own facts to determine whether the gang’s
perception of the relationship or the child’s social and economic characteristics
eliminate any reasonable ability to escape the relationship.216
Permitting asylum claims asserting this PSG would not flood the United
States with applications because the PSG is not overly broad. The proposed
PSG actually has narrow parameters, as it does not establish asylum for every
child under twelve, nor does it establish asylum for every one of the gangs’
recruits. Only children that resist recruitment face the requisite persecution for
membership in this PSG.217 Because many youths give in to gang recruitment,
those who resist are likely to be few in number.218 Hence, children who seek
asylum under this PSG are a sufficiently particular, discrete class.
B. Alleviating Residual Issues Concerning the Construction of the Proposed
PSG
Although the requisites of immutability, social visibility, and sufficient
particularity may be satisfied using the rationale outlined in DHS’s L.R.
brief,219 other concerns not covered in DHS’s brief warrant a short discussion.
First, Lukwago v. Ashcroft requires that the PSG exist independently from
the claimed persecution.220 Accordingly, regardless of whether the gangs harm
them, members of the PSG proposed in this Note will remain anticipated gang
recruits by virtue of their vulnerable age, economic situation, and habitation in

214. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text (explaining children’s inability to leave
the relationship because of the gangs’ persistance and environmental constraints).
215. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 33, at 20.
216. See id. at 16–20.
217. See Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶¶ 6, 11–12 (explaining that
refusing to give in to gang demands is what causes violent retaliation, and that those who resist
recruitment are targeted with such responses); see also supra Part I.A (defining the requisite
persecution for refugee status). Only those who face persecution are eligible to apply for asylum.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2006).
218. See supra note 8 (providing information on the large number of gang members relative
to the rest of the population); see also Corsetti, supra note 12, at 413–14 (describing the
incentives for youths to join gangs, including the lack of incentives not to do so). For example,
the children of Honduras are generally “unemployed youth[s] who are not in school” and are
“unable to develop the skills required for attending a university or obtaining skilled employment
[thus] they provide a ready pool of gang recruits. In the absence of familial and community
support, many marginalized youth[s] have turned to gangs for social support, a source of
livelihood, and protection.” SEELKE, supra note 8, at 6–7 (footnote omitted).
219. See supra Part III.A.1–3.
220. 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003).
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gang-controlled neighborhoods;221 thus, the PSG exists independent of the
gang’s persecution.
Additionally, the Board explained in S-E-G- that applicants who resist gang
recruitment do not constitute a PSG because they do not face harm anymore
severe than the harm faced by anyone else who defies a gang’s demands.222
However, this rationale stands in stark contrast to the guidance given by the
UNHCR.223 To establish eligibility for asylum, “it is not necessary for
[members of] a group to be victim[s] of a higher incidence of crime or human
rights violations than the rest of the population.”224 To say that these children
are not entitled to establish asylum eligibility just because their persecutors
also harm others for different reasons225 is to wrongfully ignore reasonable
asylum claims from children who may legitimately need protection using the
proposed PSG.226
IV. CONCLUSION
While controlling poverty-stricken urban neighborhoods through violence
and extortion, gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras forcibly recruit
children under the age of twelve to fill the lowest echelon of their ranks.
Children who resist forced recruitment are targeted for violent
retaliation—sometimes resulting in death. Because the Board’s decisions in
S-E-G- and E-A-G- held that children who resist gang recruitment do not have
a recognized basis for asylum, the United States has not been able to offer
these children protection.
The PSG proposed in this Note—“Salvadoran, Guatemalan, or Honduran
children under the age of twelve who are expected by gang members in control
of their neighborhoods to acquiesce to gang recruitment”—provides sound
means for these children to establish asylum eligibility. Following the logic set
forth by the DHS in its supplemental brief in the matter of L.R., this PSG
identifies an immutable characteristic, proves social visibility, and is
sufficiently particular to establish eligibility for asylum.
221. See supra notes 91–92, 178 and accompanying text.
222. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 587 (B.I.A. 2008).
223. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35; see also supra notes 121–22
and accompanying text.
224. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 35.
225. Gang members harm child resistors on account of their membership in the proposed
PSG, which should make them eligible for asylum. See supra Part III.A.1–3. However, gang
members also persecute other members of society for various reasons. See Guidance Note on
Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶12 (giving examples of ways that gangs target various members
of society). While the determination of whether the other harms inflicted by gangs are on account
of a protected ground falls outside the scope of this Note, the fact that gangs harm others for other
reasons should have no impact on determining the viability of this PSG.
226. Cf. Guidance Note on Refugee Claims, supra note 10, ¶ 22 (explaining that the type of
violence which is targeted specifically at children who resist gang recruitment violates a number
of human rights, and would normally be considered persecution for the purposes of asylum).

